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 1.1  Perspectives on How to Regulate in the Risk Society 
 The premise of the book is that the quest for regulation is expected to grow in the 
near future as a consequence of the  emergence of a ( world )  risk society (Beck  1992, 
 1999,  2008, 2011 ) . As an illustration, one may think of how risks related to food, 
drugs, infectious diseases, climate change, and  ﬁ nancial crises have steadily been 
penetrating all conditions of life in recent times. One of the most immediate conse-
quences of a world risk society is that the decisions, acts, and omissions of few 
entail risks for many. A major source of these emerging risks entailing large societal 
damage can be traced to the growing complexity and connectivity brought about by 
an ever more global economy. As a result, small adverse shocks can have cata-
strophic consequences (Boin  2010 ) . More formally stated, the complexity and con-
nectivity resulted in risk distribution functions with fat tails. Institutional efforts to 
manage risks have triggered different attempts to regulate several risk-related activ-
ities. Businesses, business’ products, and services are an integrated part of most con-
ditions of life and, as such, involve different risks. That is why business regulation 
must be an integrated part of this stock of risk-based regulation. 
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 Regulation has a long history. The Code of Hammurabi is a well-preserved 
Babylonian law code, dating to ca. 1700  bc . It is one of the oldest deciphered writ-
ings of signi ﬁ cant length in the world. Nearly one-half of the Code (282 laws) deals 
with matters of contract, establishing for example the wages to be paid to an ox 
driver or a surgeon. Other provisions set the terms of a transaction, establishing the 
liability of a builder for a house that collapses, for example, or property that is 
damaged while left in the care of another. 1 A more recent example of the impact and 
relevance of regulation appears from the following text part of President’s Obama 
Executive Order of 18 January 2011:
 By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States of America, and in order to improve regulation and regulatory review, it is hereby 
ordered as follows: Section 1. General Principles of Regulation: (a) Our regulatory system 
must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic 
growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation. It must be based on the best available 
science. It must allow for public participation and an open exchange of ideas. It must promote 
predictability and reduce uncertainty. It must identify and use the best, most innovative and 
least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take into account bene ﬁ ts 
and costs, both quantitative and qualitative. It must ensure that regulations are accessible, 
consistent, written in plain language, and easy to understand. It must measure, and seek to 
improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements … 
(Obama  2011 ) . 
 Many questions could be asked about the origins and functions of regulations. In 
the context of this book, we con ﬁ ne ourselves to the why and what questions related 
to regulation. 
 Why regulating? The justi ﬁ cation of regulation has different origins. The need to 
regulate arises from different perspectives: the economic, legal, sociological, political, 
and public administrative perspective. The economic perspective refers to regula-
tion that aims to enhance economic welfare. The legal perspective refers to the 
contribution of regulation to con ﬂ ict solutions, constitutional matters, and civil 
rights. The sociological perspective refers among others to social control (“regulation 
as solidi ﬁ ed behavior”). The political perspective deals with regulations as instru-
ment in the political process (“regulation as a product of the political system: a 
compromise”). The public administrative perspective stresses the cybernetic side of 
regulation (the social order). 
 What regulating? This refers to the so-called policy areas: e.g.,  ﬁ nancial,  ﬁ scal, 
competition, social security, labor market, environmental, and spatial planning 
perspective. 
 The complexities of the risk society call for a multi-lenses approach which covers 
both the aforementioned “why” and the “what” perspectives. For this reason, the 
chapters in this book are not solely based on economic argumentation, but also use 
theories from sociology, from legal science, and from administrative sciences. 
Therefore, the relevance of the capability-oriented approach—the Human 
Development Approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and Armatya Sen—should 
 1  http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codex_Hammurabi . 
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be stressed in a book dealing with business regulation (Sen  2009 ) . To quote Aristotle: 
“Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the 
sake of something else” (Aristotle, 384  bc –322  bc ). 
 1.2  Risks and Externalities 
 Because the major topic of this book is business regulation, we commence by elabo-
rating the economic justi ﬁ cation of regulation. Traditionally, the economic 
justi ﬁ cation for regulation can be traced to public sector economics and transaction 
cost economics. The normative approach offered by these subdisciplines offers 
three main arguments for government intervention driven by societal welfare, 
namely, redistribution, provision of public goods, and repair of market failure. In the 
real world of imperfect markets, regulations can be necessary to correct market 
failures such as externalities (e.g., health, safety and environmental risks), asym-
metric information (e.g., in  ﬁ nancial or labor markets), and market power (e.g., 
entry barriers), as well as correcting other problems such as unfair discrimination. 
To address externalities remains a major aim (if not the principle aim) of regulation 
(Breyer  1993 ) . Yet such repair is acceptable only when the costs of regulatory action 
(costs of regulation, government failure) are smaller than the welfare gains from the 
intervention. Risk-based regulation seeks to repair market failure at lowest possible 
costs. In particular, within a risk society, a predominant role is played by insurance 
and risk prevention. The most obvious justi ﬁ cation for governmental intervention in 
these areas is that regulation (and/or suf ﬁ cient prevention) is needed in case insurance 
cannot, for some reason, be provided by the private sector. Here it is capital market 
imperfection as market failure that calls for regulation. However, also aspects of 
redistribution can be linked to public sector provision of insurance. This is, for 
instance, the case when there are social preferences for risk solidarity, i.e. when 
people with different risk pro ﬁ les are to pay the same premiums. Other examples 
are unemployment insurance, disability provisions, and in some countries, standard 
health insurance. A major concern for regulation in these cases is, like in commercial 
insurance, to avoid moral hazard but also to avoid adverse selection and cherry 
picking. Another major area of concern for the regulator of a “risk society” is lifestyle 
risks, i.e. the way individuals address daily choices affecting their well-being 
(tobacco, alcohol, obesity, etc.) (Planzer and Alemanno  2010 ) . Similar to rising 
greenhouse gases and environmental degradation, lifestyle risks largely derive from 
another detrimental effect of individual and corporate consumption. As illustrated 
by the ongoing obesity pandemic, these new risks are increasingly calling for the 
attention of policy-makers across the globe. Until now, government’s stance to 
lifestyle risks has relied heavily on self-regulation, as illustrated by the schemes 
concluded by the food and beverage industry both in the USA and the EU, and also 
the fancy “nudge” approach (Thaler and Sunstein  2009 ) . However, the economic 
perspective seems to emerge showing that market failure might provide a solid 
argument for government intervention with respect to the prevention of obesity 
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(Anand and Gray  2009 ) . The same argument may apply to other government 
 intervention in lifestyle choices which bring about externalities. An example is 
the prohibition to smoke in pubs and public places. 
 Although regulation can solve social problems, it can also impose its own 
problems, including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary risks, and 
rent-seeking. This is illustrated in Chap.  6 , which discusses the costs and bene ﬁ ts of 
banking regulation and supervision. In the light of the above, the perspective of 
transaction cost economics is relevant because regulation inevitably brings about 
implementation costs. Transaction cost economics and the related theory of new 
institutional economics (Ménard and Shirley  2005 ) provide ideas about how to 
institutionalize regulation so that these costs are minimized. Moreover, regulators 
may make mistakes, may choose poorly designed regulations, may neglect social 
goals other than their own narrow mission (Breyer  1993 ) , may neglect the adverse 
impacts of their decisions, may aggrandize their own power, or may serve the inter-
ests of narrow groups rather than promoting broader public well-being (Kolko  1965 ; 
Ackerman and Hassler  1981 ) . There is also another important shortcoming that it is 
inherent to any attempt at systematically addressing the pressing demands of a risk 
society. Often, regulators may pursue policies that reduce some risks while intro-
ducing new risks or shifting risks to other populations (risk–risk tradeoffs) (Graham 
and Wiener  1995 ) . This tends to occur when regulators are hampered by limited 
information, bounded decision domains, or the omitted voice of the affected 
populations. 
 The main concept interconnecting societal risks and optimal government regula-
tion is the notion of trust. This is exempli ﬁ ed by Chap.  10 when discussing the role 
played by trust in pharmaceutical regulation. Under transaction cost economics, 
trust is identi ﬁ ed with calculative trust where cheating and a holdup in an explicit or 
implicit contract based on trust are avoided by the condition that the gain from 
cheating does not outweigh the costs of the loss of trust and reputation in the 
horizontal trade, or vertical principal/agent relationship. It is in accordance with 
Greif’s  ( 2000 ) way of describing an institutional setup as solution of the game of trust 
for the fundamental problem of exchange. This fundamental problem of exchange 
is, in principle, similar in a horizontal trade transaction and in a vertical G2B 
relation, which is relevant in the case of regulation. 
 1.3  Role of Government in a Risk Society 
 A rich literature has attempted to deal with similar issues in an attempt to interpret 
Beck’s vision of a world risk society. Building upon these perspectives, our reading 
of Beck’s foundational concept of risk society is that the costs associated with risks 
and with risk avoidance are increasingly perceived by the public as the responsibility 
of the government. The government has the dual role of bearing the costs of preven-
tion and compensating the public should the risk materialize. Globalization leads 
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societies to become more and more entangled. It also enhances the danger of 
contagion (see the credit crisis and the N1N1 epidemic). This is one reason that 
makes it harder for the government to timely and adequately address the demands 
of a risk society. This volume explores some of the trade-offs existing between busi-
nesses asking for less regulation and those demanding for more regulation. 
 There is another reason that makes the government’s job to deal with the demands 
from society dif ﬁ cult. The shift of responsibility for the risks to the government 
enhances the moral hazard of the society in taking risks (again see the credit crisis). 
In a way it is “privatizing the gains from taking risks and socializing the losses from 
taking risks.” One of the major shortcomings stemming from any regulation 
addressing these demands of the risk society is that it becomes increasingly more 
rules-based rather than principle-based or even trust-based. This leads to a shift 
from intrinsic motivation to comply with rules and regulations associated with risks 
and risk prevention to extrinsic motivation to abide by the rules. This shift may be 
very costly because extrinsic motivation leads to more transaction costs (in this case 
monitoring and bonding costs, see Chap.  7 ) than trust-based regulation. That led the 
former prime minister of the Netherlands, Jan Peter Balkenende, as well as the 
current UK PM, David Cameron, to operationalize Amitai Etzioni’s ideas about 
aiming at a more communitarian (or “Big”) society and to promote “self-
responsibility” of the private sector (see e.g., Etzioni  2009 ) . This reliance on 
self-responsibility can be seen as a third road between the (libertarian) idea of 
letting the market regulate and the (paternalistic) idea of making the government 
fully responsible for our well-being. It must be recognized that all attempts at opera-
tionalizing these ideas have not been successful (see the efforts of Balkenende, 
Cameron, and Obama to convert these theoretical ideas into policy practice). Yet, 
the road back from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation is a dif ﬁ cult one. That is the 
major dilemma any call for less regulation, or at least less costly regulation, faces 
today in a modern risk society where the need for regulation and international coor-
dination of regulation increases. 
 1.4  Purpose of the Book 
 The main purpose of this book is to provide a portrait of the multiple challenges 
associated with a risk society. Whilst using different disciplinary approaches, the 
book is characterized by a single driver, namely, to present current issues pertinent 
to the risk society. In so doing, it touches upon aspects of climate change, food 
safety,  ﬁ nancial crisis, and trust, but also on how to measure the costs and bene ﬁ ts of 
regulation. The authors hope that readers may  ﬁ nd in this book useful contextual 
information regarding various instances of risk society. This book might inform 
policy-makers about the business climate, social context, and environmental condi-
tions of a risk society. Ultimately the multiple realities of the risk society might help 
design public goals through risk-based regulation. From that perspective, a major 
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research question in the book is how can regulation reckon with public and private 
interests at low costs, so that there will be support for the regulatory measures and so 
that distortions from regulation could be minimized and the bene ﬁ ts from regula-
tions could be maximized. The welfare gain that the repair of market failures by 
regulation brings about should, at least, outweigh the welfare loss of that distortion. 
In Chap.  14 the book pays attention to the Standard Cost Model (SCM) as a practical 
policy tool to come to a more ef ﬁ cient business regulation. The SCM is positioned 
here in relation to other regulatory reform instruments such as regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA). Among the many questions discussed in the book: what are the 
different perspectives of these different instruments of regulatory impact assessment? 
How can they be connected? How can this way of thinking and looking help us to 
integrate these instruments into a more coherent system of regulatory impact assess-
ments which we will need to tackle the challenges of the risk society in a more effective 
and ef ﬁ cient way? The  ﬁ nal question to be answered is: what will be the conse-
quences of this synthetic view for the existing proceedings of law producing? 
 1.5  Overview of the Book 
 The book starts and  ﬁ nishes with two editorial chapters: Chap.  1 Introduction and 
Chap.  17 Conclusions. The content of the book is divided into three topic areas:
 Social risks and business regulation: Chaps.   – 2 – 6 
 Preconditions for better business regulation and international coordination:  –
Chaps.  7 – 12 
 Theoretical and measurement issues related to better business regulation: Chaps.  –
 13 – 16 
 First, social risks and business regulation will be explored by starting a discus-
sion about the role of risk management in the risk society and what risk manage-
ment by regulation can offer. Following this general introduction the focus shifts to 
the emergence of EU-risk regulation and to the examination of three different 
speci ﬁ c types of social risks: global climate change, the Agro/Food sector, and 
 ﬁ nancial risks. Virtually all these forms of regulation, by addressing social risks, 
face a common challenge: how to repair market failure at minimum costs in a global 
economy where worldwide interdependencies become increasingly important. 
 In the second part of the book, the attention shifts to an analysis of the precondi-
tions to be ful ﬁ lled from the perspective of public sector economics in order to 
achieve better business regulation in a risk society. Part of these preconditions con-
sists in the advice to broaden the view on regulatory costs so as to include insights 
from transaction cost theory. The next lessons learned will then be presented by 
discussing reduction policies with a focus on administrative burden for businesses. 
Other important elements of better regulation policies are the necessity of a cultural 
shift in the mind of lawmakers and the question of whether trusting businesses 
might be a more ef ﬁ cient “regulatory instrument” than mistrusting businesses. 
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The next theme deals with the cross-border problems of how to regulate inter national 
collusion and risks associated with trade. Here the focus is on regulation in the EU 
and on the activities of the WTO. 
 The third part of the book discusses some theoretical issues related to better busi-
ness regulation in a risk society. After an introduction chapter with an overview of 
topics related to business regulation, elements of this discussion are the positioning 
and role of the SCM as an instrument to tackle bad regulation, the number of regula-
tions in an analogy of the Laffer curve (does a regulatory optimum exist related to 
social welfare?), and theoretical re ﬂ ections about the lessons learned with sunset 
regulation in Germany, Australia, and USA. 
 The book concludes by drawing lessons about how to improve the regulatory 
process in the risk society. For that reason the book pays ample attention to techni-
cal and economic criteria, rather than prioritizing political or legal criteria—as is 
too often the case today. A multiplicity of cases is considered. At the expense of 
oversimplifying, at the one end of the spectrum there are cases where regulated 
businesses are provided with the conditions to compete at the lowest possible 
costs, without jeopardizing the related public goals, and with high compliance levels. 
At the other end of the spectrum there are cases where the complexities of the risk 
society make it dif ﬁ cult for businesses and policy-makers to have  ﬂ awless 
risk-based regulation, full economic trust, and limited transaction costs. This book 
shows that several cases from various sectors are placed in between these two ends 
of the spectrum. 
 1.6  Contents 
 1.6.1  Part I: Social Risks and Business Regulation 
 Chapter  2 identi ﬁ es the requirements for a risk governance framework inspired by 
the works of the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC). Risk governance 
faces three major challenges that result from a lack of knowledge and/or competing 
knowledge claims about the risk problem: complexity, scienti ﬁ c uncertainty, and 
sociopolitical ambiguity. In examining these three challenges, the chapter promotes 
a risk governance model that expands the classical model of risk analysis (risk 
assessment, management, communication) by including steps of pre-estimation, 
interdisciplinary risk estimation, risk characterization and evaluation, risk manage-
ment, as well as monitoring and control. This new risk governance model also 
incorporates expert, stakeholder, and public involvement as a core feature at the 
stage of communication and deliberation. 
 Chapter  3 explores how the European Union addresses the challenges brought 
about by the emergence of a “risk society.” After reconstructing the genesis and 
evolution of EU risk regulations, i.e. regulations aimed at the protection of health, 
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safety, and the environment, it identi ﬁ es the main features of the EU approach 
towards risk. Although the EU institutions have not adopted a harmonized and 
consistent  analytical approach to risk, notably to scienti ﬁ c risk assessment—given 
that it is conducted by different bodies following diverging methods—it is possible 
to  discern some common and distinctive features in the risk analysis framework that 
has been gradually adopted to manage an ever-wider range of societal risks (such as 
food safety, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, crop protection, and 
GMOs). The chapter argues that, by subscribing to a progressive ideal of regulation 
based on expertise, an embryonic European risk regulation model is taking shape 
and developing today. Yet a tension between the necessity for a rational, evidence-
based decision-making and the wider demand for a  ﬂ exible, precautionary-oriented 
regulatory approach represents the de ﬁ ning feature of the EU decision-making 
 paradigm of risk regulation. 
 Chapter  4 takes as a starting point the statement made in December 2010 when 
the international community af ﬁ rmed that “climate change is one of the greatest 
challenges of our time.” Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) further recognized that “warming of the climate sys-
tem is  unequivocal and that most of the observed increase in global average tem-
peratures since the mid twentieth century is  very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Climate change represents what 
economists call a “public good.” The theory of public sector economics teaches that 
provision of any public good is riddled with challenges of collective action, the 
incentive to free-ride; the more so when the required collective action is a global 
one.  In addition, the fact that the adverse effects of climate change are distributed 
asymmetrically—those which contributed the least suffering the most and being the 
least capable to mitigate as well as adapt to the changes—further exacerbates the 
incentives to maintain and sustain the collective action required to overcome this 
challenge. International efforts resulted in a general framework to  ﬁ ght climate 
change in the form of the UNFCCC. Measures to implement this general framework 
are embodied in transitory mechanisms embodied in the Kyoto Protocol, the only 
international instrument providing for legally binding reduction and limitation tar-
gets for developed countries together with  ﬂ exibility mechanisms to ensure the 
cost-effectiveness of reduction measures. Regulation with respect to climate change 
provides a prime example of the dif ﬁ culties in coordinating the repair of market 
failure in the global economy, where countries have different stakes and prospects 
to be hit by their own actions and by actions of others. 
 Chapter  5 ’s objective is to identify the main legal barriers to the competitiveness 
of the European food industry and to suggest ways to improve the legal system. Prior 
studies have shown that competitiveness of this industry is under pressure. The chap-
ter proposes a second overhaul of European food law, after the tremendous legal 
efforts that have been made as a response to food scares at the turn of the century. The 
proposed reform consists of eight improvements of European food law combined to 
a recommendation aimed at empowering stakeholders upstream in food supply 
chains. These improvements would not only contribute to the competitiveness of 
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the EU food supply chains through alleviation of various forms of administrative 
burdens, but also restore the power equilibrium between stakeholders within the food 
chain as well as between businesses and consumers and reduce the burdens con-
nected to pre-market approval of food and feed and zero-tolerance standards. These 
focal areas partly overlap, as the improvement of one area may positively or nega-
tively affect another. Within the proposed second overhaul of European food law, the 
rights of all stakeholders should be considered, while at present consumer concerns 
seem to eclipse the interests of other stakeholders. 
 Chapter  6 analyzes costs and bene ﬁ ts of banking regulation and supervision to 
determine whether more supervision is always better for the functioning and sta-
bility of the banking sector. Whilst the motives for additional regulation are well 
understood, their social costs are not and hence net social bene ﬁ ts of additional regu-
lation remain unclear. It is emphasized that also in regulatory terms there is no free 
lunch; regulation—much like taxation—creates social costs and these may exceed 
the bene ﬁ ts so that society is actually worse off with than without (additional) regu-
lation. And the argument is even more intricate than that, suggesting that if the layers 
of regulation in place before the crisis have given poor incentives to those in the 
 ﬁ nancial industry and their clients, a revision or even reduction of regulation might 
generate a more stable  ﬁ nancial system that is friendlier towards its customers. 
Financial regulation proposals, like those of Basel III, should ultimately align the 
behavior of  ﬁ nancial institutions with social preferences. That strongly implies that 
the political discussion on regulatory proposals should re ﬂ ect a full overview of 
relevant bene ﬁ ts and costs. The chapter argues that the current situation is far from 
this theoretical optimum. Politicians voice the public outrage over  ﬁ nancial institu-
tions that are supposedly at the root of the global  ﬁ nancial crisis and often seem most 
intent to increase consumer protection and reduce tax payer exposure. 
 The common theme of the Chaps.  2 and  3 is how to create regulatory instruments 
to tackle the risk of the risk society. A common theme of Chaps.  4 – 6 is that a major 
reason for government regulation is repair of market failure, or more speci ﬁ cally 
internalizing externalities. Examples are drawn from environmental and safety reg-
ulations, prescriptions on working conditions, various types of permits which prevent 
businesses to make decisions at the costs of others, and  ﬁ nancial regulations. 
 1.6.2  Part II: Preconditions for Better Business 
Regulation and International Coordination 
 Chapter  7 discusses a common characteristic of all of the different types of govern-
ment regulations, namely that they entail implementation costs which, like taxes, 
distort ef ﬁ cient allocation in the ideal general equilibrium. These costs can be 
quite substantial but tend to be overlooked in the discussion and development of 
government policy. By applying the perspective of transaction cost economics, this 
chapter considers the costs arising from regulation in a principal/agent model. Three 
types of transaction costs can be distinguished, namely, (1) monitoring costs of the 
10 A. Alemanno et al.
regulator (principal); (2) bonding costs by the regulated private economic entities 
(agent); and (3) the costs of residual loss in case the result of the regulation is not in 
compliance with the targets set by the regulating authorities. These latter costs can 
be regarded as cost to society due to, e.g., miscommunication on the aims of regula-
tion and are, of course, hard to quantify. Bonding and monitoring costs consist of 
both “hard” and “soft” transaction costs. Hard transaction costs are direct costs and 
are easy to quantify. Soft transaction costs are indirect costs and are hard, or even 
impossible, to quantify. The costs of residual loss are welfare losses and can be 
typi ﬁ ed as soft transaction costs. The main bene ﬁ t of regulatory measures is the 
avoidance of societal costs that would occur in a situation where regulation is mea-
ger or absent. Therefore, it may be welfare enhancing if regulations are fashioned in 
such a way that net bene ﬁ ts are optimized. From that perspective the chapter looks 
at the possibility to select optimal regulation by means of a cost/bene ﬁ t analysis. 
 Chapter  8 discusses how from the 1980s onwards, an increasing number of 
countries has conducted an economic policy where the role of the government, and 
therefore the extent of regulation, was reduced. The idea was that in a scenario of 
less government, i.e. lower tax and premium rates, lower de ﬁ cits, lower debts, less 
regulation, and less compliance costs, markets would function better. It would 
enhance economic development. The good performance of the US and UK 
economies—and later that of many other economies—in the late 1990s seemed to 
support this approach. However, the internet crisis around 2000 and the dramatic 
 ﬁ nancial and economic crisis of 2007–2010 changed these ideas about the retreat of 
the government being favorable for economic development. From that perspective 
this chapter wonders whether full reliance on the invisible hand of market forces is 
really bene ﬁ cial, and whether less government and less rules and regulations are 
really the right alternatives to realize the most desirable pattern of economic devel-
opment. What is the relationship between the level of compliance and the pattern of 
economic development? Has it helped countries to better deal with the impact of the 
recent economic crisis? These questions are investigated in an empirical analysis, 
considering relationships both between countries and over time, and using data 
from World Bank and OECD. The results are at variance with the predominant con-
ventional wisdom of the proponents of deregulation: less regulation seems not to 
have been bene ﬁ cial for economic development and also has not made countries 
better able to deal with the recent  ﬁ nancial and economic crisis. Even though these 
analyses can be regarded as preliminary and a starting point for further study, the 
results produced in this chapter do show that a reduction of regulation has not 
been as bene ﬁ cial to the economic performance, as many had believed thus far. 
 Chapter  9 addresses the complementarities of culture (bottom up) and structure 
(top down) for the reduction of regulatory burdens. It speci ﬁ cally looks into the case 
of the Netherlands; however, the lessons learned are generic in kind. Dutch policies 
on better regulation aim at a cultural shift and structural safeguards. It is found that 
besides a supportive culture within ministries, it is necessary to establish adequate 
structures on reducing regulatory burdens. A sole reliance on internal pressures 
leads to unpredictable outcomes. For a consequent application of routines and 
procedures that ensure that administrative burdens are accounted for structural 
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safeguards must be in place. Such safeguards comprise of a separate conduct of 
scrutiny, accountability (and/or transparency of the effects) and the attribution of 
responsibility, and, consequently, problem ownership. It is found that a real separa-
tion of scrutiny function and legislation function is necessary. Both tasks may com-
prise of different skills, values, loyalties, and responsibilities. This calls for an 
enduring structure of checks and balances to ensure the attention for regulatory 
burdens in the policy process. 
 Chapter  10 discusses government regulation and trust. In recent years trust has 
been employed in academic, industry, and policy circles as a common buzzword to 
describe some of the most complex issues underpinning the relationship between 
industry and regulators in relation to risk. The ongoing perception of a trust crisis in 
the pharmaceutical sector is the starting point for analyzing how institutional trust is 
construed by the pharmaceutical industry. Through evidence collected from a set of 
interviews to individuals working in the pharmaceutical sector, this chapter examines 
what is meant when the industry talks about trust in respect to regulators. The chapter 
reviews the three broad functions of trust in relation to institutions as identi ﬁ ed in the 
vast literature on trust; it details the role of the media in relation to trust vis-à-vis 
regulators and the industry; it de ﬁ nes which applied functions of trust were identi ﬁ ed 
from the interviews; it considers the problems associated with making trust opera-
tional from an industry perspective; and it speculates on what can be learned for other 
sectors. By relying on a set of interviews, it delineates  ﬁ ve typologies of trust which 
coincide with the diverse roles this plays for the various constituents 
 Chapter  11 , by taking the perspective of the risk society and building upon the 
 ﬁ ndings of recent research, illustrates a number of examples of loss of competitive-
ness resulting from non-transparent, non-streamlined, ineffective, double, or non-
harmonized legislation and enforcement between Member States and regions in 
Europe. In particular, the chapter shows that “cross-border barriers” may lead to 
serious costs and burden for business. Furthermore it seems that these costs and 
burdens have not been tackled during the more than 20 years of so-called “better 
regulation initiatives” in Europe. These initiatives were basically Member-State ori-
ented and focused on European and national legislation separately. An integrated 
cross-border approach to control cross-border consistency does exist neither at the 
EU- nor at a national level. Introduction of a new multilayer approach, in which 
assessment not only covers national and European impact, but also cross-border 
effects, is presented as a possible solution to this system failure. As part of the 
European Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) procedure, this approach could lead 
to a new legislative principle of “cross-border consistency” and furthermore to the 
development of a practical “cross-border consistency check” to transform the exist-
ing EU legislative procedure from “better” to “best regulation.” Such a new legisla-
tive principle could beforehand draw attention to possible ways to avoid adverse 
effects of differences in legislation and procedures. Solutions could be found by 
more harmonization or streamlining but also by more transparency and overview 
over the existing differences. 
 Chapter  12 discusses the role of globalization for world trade. The world econ-
omy has become key for economic development because a business environment is 
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created for operation of global companies. In the last decades international trade 
between countries has reached unprecedented volumes, but this rise has been 
accompanied by the emergence in global risks, often hidden as nontariff barriers to 
trade (NTBs). Apart from traditional commercial risks, countries and global companies 
are faced with a wide variety of noncommercial risks, like political, societal, and 
ecological risks. In order to tackle this emerging number of obstacles to trade, coun-
tries agreed to establish an international economic organization as an important 
international legal instrument: the World Trade Organization (WTO). The basic 
principles of WTO guarantee nondiscrimination and predictability in trade relations 
of WTO member countries. The WTO agreements, by establishing the legal frame-
work for a multilateral trading system, aim at governing the risks of unpredictable 
acts of WTO member governments. Yet as of today the most important achievement 
of the WTO is the phasing out of tariff barriers. However, to effectively address the 
mounting number of NTBs, risk analysis was integrated in the WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS). It requires that scienti ﬁ c evidence be advanced 
when introducing domestic regulations that may have negative effect on international 
trade. In spite of the great efforts of countries to eliminate global risks, new risks 
constantly appear. The ongoing round of multilateral trade negotiation in the WTO 
should aim at removing these obstacles to international trade. 
 Awareness of regulatory costs and regulation as such, the effect of national regu-
lations in international and cross-border settings, and internalization and trust are 
the common themes in Chaps.  7 – 12 . 
 1.6.3  Part III: Theoretical and Measurement Issues 
Related to Better Business Regulation 
 Chapter  13 discusses the role played by the OECD in regulatory reform. Over the 
past 15 years, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has played a pioneering role in bringing the issue of regulatory reform to 
the fore. Much has been achieved over the years, with many countries bene ﬁ tting 
from the potential offered by quality regulation. Still, the recent crisis exposed 
massive  ﬂ aws in regulation, as well as in supervision and enforcement. Other events 
are also testing the limits of regulatory frameworks. Regulatory policy is currently 
at the crossroads, as it needs to integrate a broader governance perspective to address 
current and future challenges. The chapter takes stock of the current debate on regu-
latory reform and discusses possible pathways to address the goal of the future 
agenda—i.e. restoring trust in government through effective regulatory governance. 
This involves a tighter integration between the organization and the management of 
reform. It also requires completing the policy cycle, closing the loop between regu-
latory design and evaluation of outcomes, with evidence-based approaches to support 
proportionate decisions and policy coherence and better assessment of the bene ﬁ ts 
of regulation. 
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 Chapter  14 is devoted to a detailed and critical analysis of the Standard Cost 
model (SCM). This is a policy instrument for measuring the compliance costs of 
legal information obligations from businesses, institutions, and civilians to govern-
ment and governmental institutions. The main function of these information obliga-
tions is to allow government monitoring compliance. Since 2003, the  ﬁ rst generation 
of the SCM—SCM 1.0—spread very quickly over more than 20 countries. Yet, now 
that its use has proliferated and many practical experiences are available, time has 
come for a critical check. This could provide thoughts for improvement and elabo-
ration of the model towards a new generation of the SCM, the SCM 2.0. Looking 
from the perspective of a risk society, it becomes apparent that a strategy of deregu-
lation should be replaced by a strategy of better (business) regulation. After all, 
better regulation is one of the cornerstones for effective risk management. How 
could a SCM 2.0  ﬁ t in such a strategy? Strong features of the SCM are its capacity 
to reduce complexity—standardization of compliance—and its  ﬂ exibility. These 
features seem to  ﬁ t to the mainstream theories on policy-making: bounded rational-
ity of the “administrative man,” mixed scanning, incrementalism, and nonsequen-
tial policy stages. The big challenges for the next generation of the SCM—SCM 
2.0—are to add modules for standardized  ﬁ nancial and substantive compliance 
costs and standardized bene ﬁ ts. In addition, a safeguard against compromising 
political rationality should be constructed, inspired by the technical rationality, the 
means to achieve the public goals of the risk society. The SCM 2.0 could be helpful 
in this respect. 
 Chapter  15 discusses the regulatory costs of taxation from an economic point of 
view. First, a theoretical Laffer curve for tax regulatory costs is developed. This 
curve shows that there is an optimum somewhere between too much and too little 
regulation. In that respect the chapter intermediates between the  ﬁ ndings of Chap.  6 
that the new regulations for the banking industry, in reaction to the credit crisis, may 
be too costly for society, and the  ﬁ ndings of Chap.  8 that less regulation has not been 
bene ﬁ cial to society. From this perspective Chap.  15 provides an overview of the 
literature on tax regulatory costs. Finally, some remarks are made about the inci-
dence of a tax regulatory Laffer curve . 
 Chapter  16 surveys the use of sunset legislation in three countries, namely, USA, 
Australia, and Germany. A sunset clause causes a particular law or statutory instru-
ment to expire after a  ﬁ xed number of years; a sunset clause has two main charac-
teristics. First, by shifting the burden of proof from those who would terminate 
a regulation to those who want to renew it, it creates a “threat of termination.” 
Second, an inclusion of a sunset clause requires a periodic review and evaluation of 
the effectiveness and ef ﬁ ciency of government functions and programs. Based on 
theoretical re ﬂ ections of policy termination and evaluation, the chapter analyzes the 
empirical experiences on how sunset legislation can foster different policy goals 
and discusses the possibilities to connect sunset legislation to risk-based decision-
making. If used systematically for selected laws, sunsetting can be a feasible instru-
ment to support better business regulation. 
 The common theme of the Chaps.  13 – 16 is taking stock of existing regulatory 
policies and instruments in order to  ﬁ nd new ways to better regulations. 
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